Chickpea processing, flour milling and branded packaged foods

The company buys agricultural raw material, converts it at a single owned plant into processed chickpea, flour and packaged foods, and sells the output through three customer routes. Each route takes a different fraction of the same input, which is what makes the model work at this scale.

The transition from trade to brand and flour is the whole investment case, and it is not yet visible in the numbers. No advertising, marketing or brand-promotion line appears in the FY25 statement of profit and loss; the largest discretionary items are cash discount at ₹30.03 lakh and packing material at ₹15.36 lakh. A buyer will therefore read the FY25 result as a well-run commodity converter with a brand and flour ambition attached, and will price that optionality separately.

The economics are those of a converter with a thin spread: raw material is bought at market, processed and milled, and sold on within weeks. Margin comes from grading accuracy, milling yield and the ability to place every fraction of the input.

Every rupee of margin is competed for at both ends of the line. Procurement is 89.4% of revenue and there is no disclosed hedging or forward-buying policy, so the gross spread moves with the raw-material cycle rather than being contracted. What the company controls is grading accuracy, milling yield and the cash cycle — which has taken ₹1.77 of working capital out of every rupee of revenue. The operating discipline is the asset here, not a pricing position.

This is the strongest documented improvement in the business. Inventory and receivables have both turned materially faster while revenue grew 7.6×, and the funding benefit is larger than the entire FY25 EBITDA.

Two things follow. First, the improvement is a genuine operating gain and it is repeatable in kind, not just in size — the company has proved it can collect faster than it grows. Second, working capital still absorbed ₹102.18 lakh in FY25, which is almost exactly the year's EBITDA of ₹104.72 lakh. Faster turns have not yet converted into cash generation, because volume growth keeps adding absolute inventory. That gap is the clearest single reason the company needs equity rather than more debt.

Procurement is the business. Raw material consumed is 89.4% of revenue, so the supply side sets both the gross spread and the working capital requirement.

Six suppliers crossed the threshold for tax deduction on purchases of goods in FY25, against four in FY24. That is evidence of a broadening base rather than a concentrated one, and it is consistent with a business buying in the open market rather than on contracts. The flip side is that no supply agreement, price formula or volume commitment is disclosed anywhere in the audited file, so a buyer cannot test whether the FY25 spread is repeatable in a rising raw-material market. Inventory carrying ₹475.04 lakh at year end is the company's only hedge, and it is an unhedged one.

Customers are retail shoppers, institutional buyers and cattle-feed offtakers. A repeat order is triggered by grading consistency, flour quality and delivery reliability on a commodity where the buyer can switch supplier within a week.

• Revenue grew 4.0× in FY24 and a further 90.7% in FY25 — a two-year compound rate of 176%.
• Equity rose by only ₹19.52 lakh across the two years while borrowings rose by ₹374.54 lakh; growth has been debt-financed.
• Trade payables rose from ₹26.65 lakh to ₹123.99 lakh in FY25, a 4.7× increase — supplier credit is now a material funding source.
• Closing cash fell to ₹2.17 lakh at 31 March 2025, from ₹23.85 lakh a year earlier.
• Finance cost of ₹72.32 lakh consumed 69% of EBITDA in FY25.

EBITDA in this document is profit before tax, adjusted for depreciation and finance cost, taken from the audited statements. Profit before tax is after depreciation and finance cost but before tax. No normalisation has been applied to any figure presented.

What moved margin. The gross spread widened by 5.2 points between FY23 and FY24, then gave back 1.4 points in FY25. Procurement intensity went 93.2% → 88.0% → 89.4%, so the movement is raw-material cost, not overhead leverage. Other operating expenses held flat as a share of revenue across FY24 and FY25 at 5.4% and 5.5%, which means the company has absorbed the cost of serving 90% more revenue without adding overhead — and equally, that it has not yet spent anything on brand building.

Cash conversion. No cash flow statement is included in any of the three audited files, so operating cash flow cannot be compared against EBITDA directly. On the available figures, FY25 EBITDA of ₹104.72 lakh less finance cost of ₹72.32 lakh and tax of ₹4.62 lakh leaves ₹27.78 lakh before working capital and capex — against a working capital absorption of ₹102.18 lakh. On that basis the year consumed cash. FY25 cash capex was small, at ₹3.55 lakh of plant and machinery additions; the ₹213.99 lakh building was transferred from work-in-progress carried on the FY24 balance sheet, not spent in FY25.

Leverage and related parties. Net debt has fallen from 31.5× to 7.3× EBITDA, but only because EBITDA grew 8.5× while net debt grew 2.0×. Related-party unsecured borrowings rose from ₹47.32 lakh to ₹221.02 lakh in FY25, which is 29% of the borrowing stack and 2.1× EBITDA. In the FY25 accounts a related-party advance of ₹11.69 lakh was netted against a related-party loan rather than shown gross, and the restated FY24 comparative balance sheet is ₹13.69 lakh lower than the FY24 audited balance sheet as a result. Any buyer will re-cut this stack: related-party debt is usually either converted to equity or repaid from proceeds, and either route changes the equity value.

The company is promoter-run and promoter-funded. All four directors hold equity and three of them are also lenders to the business, which aligns interest but concentrates both decision-making and credit risk in the same four people.

The company is offering a primary equity stake to fund a branded-consumer and flour-milling transition on top of an already-scaled processing base. Nothing in the audited file suggests a sale of control; the structure on offer is growth capital.

Buyer profile. Three sets fit. Strategic acquirers in branded foods and staples who want a processing footprint, flour capacity and six shelf-ready brands. Growth-equity and lower-mid-market private-equity funds with an agri or consumer thesis, who will underwrite the brand transition rather than the commodity base. Family offices and strategic individuals seeking a controlled position in a scaled regional processor. Financial buyers are more likely than trade buyers to fund the full ₹7 Cr as primary capital, because a trade buyer would more naturally buy control outright.

The information pack is complete at the level of audited financials and management material. The customer schedule and the FY26 bridge are the two items that gate a priced offer.